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1. Introduction
In a Liber dedicated to Professor Henry Schermers, it seems appropriate to
address one of the topics in which hè himself has always taken special interest:
the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights (the
ECHR) and the legal order of the European Community. Having closely
followed the development of the three Communities from their very inception,
and having been a member of the European Commission of Human Rights
since 1981, Schermers is one of the first scholars to stand at the crossroads
where these two legal Systems meet.
He has moreover had a clear vision of the issues lying ahead: when hè left
the University of Amsterdam in order to take up his post in Leiden, his farewell
lecture dealt with the possibilities of ensuring mat the Community would
respect human rights.1 Having discussed several options, Schermers spoke out
in favour of the Community's accession to the ECHR. This was 1978, some
time before the EC Commission issued the Memorandum in which it arrived
at the same conclusion.2
It is 1993. Schermers has delivered another farewell lecture and the question
whether the Community should accede to the ECHR has still not been settled.
Foliowing the 1979 Memorandum, no action was taken. In 1990, the Commis-
sion explicitly asked the Council to approve a mandate for formal negotiations
* R.A. Lawson is a lecturer at the Europa Instituut, University of Leiden, the Nether-
lands.
1. H.G Schermers, De binding van de Europese Gemeenschap aan mensenrechten,
farewell lecture at the Europa Instituut, University of Amsterdam, 29 June 1978;
reprinted as 'The Communities under the European Convention on Human Rights', in
Legal Issues of European Integration (L.I.E.I.) 1978/1, pp. 1-8.
2. Memorandum of 4 April 1979, Bulletin of the European Communities 4-1979 (no.
1.3.1) and Suppl. 2/79.
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with the Council of Europe.3 Again the Member States seemed to ignore the
issue and it appears that sorae of them, or at least some policy makers, maintain
their traditional reluctance.4
To some extent, the accession debate has been obfuscated by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). It was argued in the early 1970's, that the protection
of human rights in the legal order of the Community was insufficient. In a more
or less improvised response, the ECJ expressed its willingness to consider
fundamental rights as general principles of Community law, the observance of
which it ensures. The ECJ was thus able to protect fundamental rights in
individual cases, despite the absence of specific human rights provisions in the
constituent Treaties. This 'solution de dépannage'5 has in turn led some com-
mentators to the rather paradoxical conclusion that, since human rights are pro-
tected, Community accession to the ECHR is only of theoretical interest,
without much practical relevance.6
It is the purpose of this contribution to investigate the validity of this
assertion. After a summary of the ECJ's case-law regarding human rights and
the scope of its review (§ 2), attention will focus on the freedom which the ECJ
enjoys in interpreting the provisions of the ECHR (§ 3). Subsequently, some
recent cases will be examined in which the ECJ was directly confronted with
specific human rights claims. We will see the extent to which the response of
the Court, and its Advocates General, has been in conformity with the case-law
of the bodies specifically entrusted with the task of interpreting and protecting
3. Notice SEC(90)2087 def. of 19 Nov. 1990; see Bulletin of the European Communities
10-1990, p. 76 (no. 1.3.218) and 11-1990, p. 72 (no. 1.3.203). The European Parliament
expressed its support: Resolution on respect for human rights in the European Com-
munity (annual report of the European Parliament), O.J. 1993, C 115/180, at § 9.
4. See for a recent discussion in the UK: House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities, Human Rights Re-examined, 23 June 1992, with evidence by
various experts; see also the comments by a Danish official in a recent panel discussion
in The Hague, reported in R.A. Lawson, 'Human Rights Protection in Europe: The
Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human
Rights', in R. Lefeber (ed.), Proceedings of the Second Joint Conference of the Ameri-
can Society for International Law and the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal
Recht (to appear early 1994).
5. This term was coined by R. Lecourt, former President of the ECJ, 'Cour européenne
des Droits de l'Homme et Cour de Justice des Communautées européennes', in F.
Matscher & H. Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension
(Essays in honour of G.J. Wiarda) (1988), pp. 335-340, at p. 336.
6. See for example the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities,
supra note 4, at p. 28. § 71. The Community's unwritten but judicially discovered 'Bill
of Rights' may, of course, be more attractive to a common law country than to
Continental lawyers.
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the rights of the ECHR: the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
(§ 4). This exercise may enable us to state whether it is true that Community
accession to the ECHR would be without much practical relevance as the ECJ
already ensures adequate protection (§ 5).
2. The Protection of Fundamental Rights by the European Court of
Justice
In this section, the sources of fundamental rights as applied by the ECJ and the
scope of its review will be briefly discussed. As will be seen, the case-law of
the ECJ has developed gradually with respect to both issues and may not yet
have reached maturity. As a preliminary point, it should be remarked that this
review is limited to the rights guaranteed in the ECHR.
2.1. The Sources of Fundamental Rights
In 1970, respect for fundamental rights as such was recognized by the ECJ as
forming 'an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court
of Justice'. The Court added that' [t]he protection of such rights, whilst inspired
by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured
within the framework and objectives of the Community'.7 Four years later, the
ECJ addressed this matter again in the Nold case. The relevant passage is worth
quoting for the purpose of our review:
In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures
which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitu-
tions of those States. Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights
on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law.8
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1134, following a famous
obitcr dictum in case 26/69, Stauder [1969] ECR 425. Implicitly the ECJ referred to
Art. 164 EEC as the legal basis for its position. See on this aspect: M.H. Mendelson,
'The European Court of Justice and Human Rights', in Yearbook of European Law
IY.E.L.) vol. l (1981), pp. 125-165, at pp. 152-162. Hilf mentioned a proposal in 1975
to change the text of Article 164 into: 'The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaty the law and especially the fundamental
rights of the citizens are observed'; see M. Hilf, 'The Protection of Fundamental Rights
in the Community', in F.G. Jacobs (ed.), European Law and the Individual (1976), pp.
145-160, at p. 146.
Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 507. It is interesting to note that the
222 R. Lawson
It is commonly considered that these judgments were prompted, at least to a
certain extent, by anxiety in some Member States about the allegedly inad-
equate protection of human rights at Community level.9 By providing for
human rights review by itself, the ECJ attempted (largely successfully) to
prevent national courts from assessing Community acts for human rights
compliance, as that would threaten the supremacy and integrity of Community
law.10 But whatever may have sparked Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and
Nold, the ECJ continued to develop its human rights case-law in the 1970's and
1980's. In response to claims made by litigants and requests for preliminary
rulings, it has been prepared to refer11 to fundamental rights recognized in the
English translation of the judgment speaks of 'treaties'. This is similar to the German
version, the official language of the case, which refers to 'die international Verträge'.
By contrast, the French text, used in the internal deliberations of the Court, refers to
'les instruments internationaux' and the Dutch version to 'internationale wilsverklarin-
gen'. The English/German translation of course is more restrictive as it seems to
exclude non-binding instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the texts adopted in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE). It is submitted that the more extensive expression should be
followed as there are no a priori reasons why the ECJ should be unable to take the
principles enshrined in non-binding texts into account. In other situations, the ECJ has
indeed been prepared to use non-binding rules of public international law: see H.G.
Schermers & D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (5th
ed., 1992), pp. 100-102.
9. This concern was expressed especially by the German and Italian Constitutional Courts;
see for a comment from those days: A.Z. Drzemczewski, 'Fundamental Rights and the
European Communities: Recent Developments', in The Human Rights Review vol. II,
nr. l (Spring 1977), pp. 69-86. See for a contemporary comment: H.G. Schermers, 'The
Scales in Balance: National Constitutional Court v. Court of Justice', in Common
Market Law Review (CML Rev.) vol. 27 (1990), pp. 97-105.
10. See e.g. J.H.J. Weiier, 'Methods of Protection: Towards a Second and Third Generation
of Protection', in J.H.J. Weiier, A. Cassese & A. Clapham (eds.), Human Rights and
the European Community (1991), vol. II, pp. 555-642, at p. 580.
11. It has often been noted that most of the ECJ's references to human rights merely
support a conclusion already reached on other grounds. To my knowledge, no claims
based on human rights alone have been upheld by the ECJ. Coppel & O'Neill submit
that Wachauf was decided 'on fundamental rights grounds' (J. Coppel & A. O'Neill,
'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?', in CML Rev. vol. 29
(1992), pp. 669-692, at p. 676) but at the same time they express their regret that in
this case fundamental rights 'were treated as no more than a principle of interpretation
(...) and only to the extent that this is compatible with the wording of the Community
legislation' (at pp. 683-684).
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constitutions of the Member States,12 to specific provisions of the ECHR13
and, to a lesser extent, to other human rights treaties.14
The way in which Nold was phrased suggests that human rights treaties are
°f less importance to the ECJ than the constitutions of Member States. With
nindsight, however, it appears that there were mainly historical reasons for the
very careful and indirect reference to, essentially, the ECHR. Indeed, it emerges
trom the more recent case-law that the European Convention holds a special
Place as a source for the Court's catalogue of fundamental rights.15 This shift
°f emphasis has been confirmed in Article F § 2 of the Treaty on European
Union:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community law.16
l2- See for example case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission [1982] ECR 1610-
1611 and joined cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission [1989] ECR 2924.
13. See for example case 36/75, R. Rutiü v. Minster for the Inferior [1975] ECR 1232; case
44/79, Hauerv. Land Rheinland Pfalz [1979] ECR 3744; case 63/83, Kent Kirk [1984]
ECR 2718 and case 222/86, Heylens [1987] ECR 4117.
*4. See for a reference to the European Social Charter: case 24/86, Blaizot [1988] ECR
403; for a reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: case
374/87, Orkem v. Commssion [1989] ECR 3351; and for references to ILO Conven-
tions: case 43/75, Defrenne [1976] ECR 473 and case C-158/91, Ministère public et
Direction du travail et d'emploi v. J.C. Levy, judgment of 2 August 1993, not yet
reported in ECR.
15- See for example case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECR 1682, Hoechst, supra note 12, at
P- 2923, and case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR 1-2963. The ECJ was apparently
encouraged by the support for its approach as expressed in the Joint Declaration of the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1977, O.J. 1977, C
103/1 (referring 'in particular' to the ECHR) and the third paragraph of the preamble
to the Single European Act, O.J. 1987, L 169/1 (referring to both the ECHR and the
European Social Charter); see case 249/86, Commission v. Germany [1989] ECR 1290.
"• It is revealing that the 1991 draft treaty, as proposed by the Netherlands presidency,
did not even refer to the constitutional traditions at all: Art. G § 2 read: 'The Union
shali respect the rights and freedoms as recognized in the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (see Europe Documents
No. 1746/1747 of 20 Nov. 1991, p. 3). It has been argued that Art. F § 2 TEU in its
final form fails to codify the ECJ's case-law adequately. No reference have been made
to either the Protocols to the ECHR or other human rights treaties like the European
Social Charter (in contrast to the SEA, supra note 15). See G. Gaja, 'The Protection
of Human Rights under the Maastricht Treaty', in D. Curtin & T. Heukels (eds.),
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2.2. The Scope of the ECJ's Fundamental Rights Review
In developing its fundamental rights case-law, the ECJ initially limited itself
to reviewing the validity of Community acts. Ho wever, in recent years the case-
law has gone rather further in a direction not reflected in Article F § 2.
Incrementally, the ECJ is prepared to accept and even extend the position taken
by Advocate General Jacobs in the Wachauf case:
(...) it appears to me self-evident that when acting in pursuance of powers granted under
Community law, Member States must be subject to the same constraints, in any event
in relation to the principle of respect for human rights, as the Community legislator."
It may appear self-evident, but in fact this step completes the circle. Initially
the ECJ introduced fundamental rights as general principles of Community law
derived from the human rights commitments of the Member States, apparently
in response to the fear that human rights protection at Community level was
inadequate. Now the ECJ is told to observe that the Member States live up to
what in fact were once their own Standards. Be that as it may, the Court
explicitly held in Wachauf that 'the requirements of the protection of funda-
mental rights in the Community legal order' are 'also binding on the Member
States when they implement Community rules'.18 The ECJ's assumption of
competence for human rights review not only vis-ä-vis the Community institu-
tions, but also vis-ä-vis the Member States, results in a Situation where the
Community may be said to have moved from 'respecting' to 'ensuring' human
rights.19
The extent to which Member State action can be reviewed has not yet been
fixed. Wachauf showed that the ECJ considers itself competent to review
Institutionell Dynamics ofEuropean Integration (the tripiet volume of this Über amico-
runi), and the Dutch section of the International Commission of Jurists, NJCM, in its
comments on the Treaty, NJCM-bulletin/Nederiands Tijdschrift voor de Mensenrechten
(NJCM-Bullelin) vol. 17 (1992), pp. 711-713.
17. Case 5/88, H. Wachauf v. Germany [1989] ECR 2629. This approach was advocated
by J.H.H. Weiier, 'The European Court at a Crossroads: Community Human Rights
and Member State Action', in F. Capotorti et al. (eds.) Du droit international au droit
de Integration (Über amicomm Pierre Pescatore) (1987), pp. 821-842.
18. Wachauf, ibidem, at p. 2639.
19. Compare Art. F § 2 TEU, referring to 'respect', and the terms used by the EP in its
Resolution on respect for human rights in the European Community: the EP 'stresses
that the Community must ensure that human rights are respected in the Member States
in order to lend maximum credibility to its commitment to human rights in the rest
of the world' (supra note 3, at § 11, emphasis added).
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measures of national authorities for human rights compliance where they act
m fact as the executive of the Community, e.g. by enforcing an agricultural
levy System.20 A similar approach is taken in cases where national authorities
act in a field which is regulated by Community law, e.g. when implementing
a Directive.21 But the scope of the ECJ's human rights review is broader still.
Thus, if national authorities restrict one of the fundamental freedoms under the
EEC Treaty, the ECJ holds that in order to be justified, the restriction should
comply inter alia with the provisions of the ECHR. It can be argued that the
1975 Rutili case is an early example of this position; it was in any event con-
firmed in very plain terms in the 1991 ERT judgment.22
More controversial is the question how far the jurisdiction of the ECJ
extends with respect to national measures which are not, to use the words of
the Advocate General in Wachauf, 'in pursuance of powers granted under
Community law'. One limit was set in Cinéthèque and Demirel:
Although it is the duty of the Court to ensure observance of fundamental rights in the
field of Community law, it has no power to examine the compatibility with the European
Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the scope of Commun-
ity law.23
This may seem self-evident but the question remains, of course, which matters
actually fall (exclusively? mainly?) outside the scope of Community law. In
the recent Konstantinidis case, Advocate General Jacobs proposed a far-reach-
mg answer. He submitted that any human rights violation inflicted upon a civis
europeus, i.e. a migrating Community national who benefits from the free
2o- See also case 201/85, Klensch [1986] ECR 3507.
*• See Johnston, supra note 15, and Commission v. Germany, supra note 15.
•'2. Rutili, supra note 13; ERT, supra note 15, p. 2964. The same position was already
defended by AG Trabucchi in case 118/75, Watson & Belmann [1976] ECR 1207. See
also the Opinion of AG Van Gerven in case C-159/90, Grogan [1991] ECR 1-4722 and,
for an iinplicit example, Heylens, supra note 13. The Dutch 'media' cases are remark-
able as the Netherlands govemment sought to rely on Art. 10 ECHR to defend restric-
tions applying to broadcasting corporations; see, inter alia, case 353/89, Commission
v. the \etherlands [1991] ECR 1-4097.
23' Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECR 3754, emphasis added, which slightly changed the
dictum in joined cases 60-61/84, Cinéthèque [1985] ECR 2627; compare ERT, supra
note 15, p. 2964 and Grogan, supra note 22, at p. 4733. See for critical remarks on
this aspect of the Cinéthèque case: Weiier, supra note 17, and on the Demirel case:
5-H.H. Weiler 'Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the
Human Rights of Non-EC Naüonals - A Critique', in European Journal of Internatio-
nal Law vol. 3 (1992), pp. 65-91.
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movement provisions, would as such be a violation of Community law.24 In
its judgment the ECJ did not react to the submissions of the Advocate General,
so it is still uncertain whether 'the scope of Community law' includes this very
broad category of situations. Fortunately it is not the purpose of the present
contribution to attempt to solve this enigma.25
One last remark relates to the intensity of the review of national actions.
When Advocate General Trabucchi suggested, in 1976, that the ECJ should
review whether Italian rules, relating to the registration of foreigners, complied
with the ECHR, hè immediately added that the Court could not to look into
an infringement of a fundamental right by a State body 'to the same extent to
which it could do so in reviewing the validity of Community acts'.26 This
suggests that the ECJ's fundamental rights test should not be equally demand-
ing when national measures are under review. It does not appear from the more
recent case-law, however, that the ECJ is prepared to make such a distinction.
The formulation of Wachauf and ERT, echoing Nold ('the Court cannot accept
measures ...'), does not leave much room for separate methods of testing Com-
munity and national acts. On the other hand, the ECJ has been willing to grant
the State authorities 'an area of discretion' when restricting for example the free
movement of workers under Article 48(3).27
As a general conclusion it may be stated that the ECJ will review legislative
and administrative acts of the Community institutions on the one hand and
measures adopted by the Member States on the other hand, either (a) 'when
they implement Community rules' or (b) when they, in one way or another, fall
'within the scope of Community law'. This may be a rough sketch, but it
enables us to presume that the gradual expansion of the ECJ's human rights
review will necessarily lead to an increase in the number of human rights cases
24. Opinion in case C-168/91, Konstantinidis [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 401, not yet reported in
ECR; cf. F.G. Jacobs, 'The Protection of Human Rights in the Member States of the
European Communities: The Impact of the Case law of the Court of Justice', in J.
O'Reilly (ed.), Human Rights and Constitutional Law (Essays in Honour of Brian
Walsh) (1992), pp. 243-250. One cannot escape the Impression that this AG applies
a fine piece of salami tactics here; compare this case to hls position in Wachauf, supra
note 17.
25. See, inter alia, J. Temple Lang, 'The Sphere in Which Member States are Obliged to
Comply with the General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights
Principles', in L.I.E.I. 1991/1 pp. 23-35.
26. Opinion in Watson & Belmann, supra note 22, p. 1207.
27. See e.g. case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1350 and case 30/77,
R. v. Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 2014. See, however, joined cases 115 & 116/81, Adoui
& Cornuaille v. Belgium [1982] ECR 1707-1708.
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before it and thus to a proliferation of rather delicate and politically sensitive
issues to be decided by the Luxembourg Court.
3. Interpreting Rights: The Fundamental Freedom of the ECJ
It will be clear that the ECJ allows itself considerable freedom when applying
fundamental rights. As we have seen, the Court considers itself bound to draw
Inspiration' from constitutionally guaranteed rights whereas human rights
treaties can supply 'guidelines'. Ulysses may have tied himself to the mast, but
this time hè has made sure that the knots remain within his own reach. By
definition the ECJ will not apply human rights as they have been interpreted
by either national courts or international supervisory bodies. Rather, these inter-
pretations will assist the Court in its task of defining, or re-creating, fundamen-
tal rights (the Court always refers to 'fundamental', not human, rights) as a
special category of general principles of Community law.28
The advantage of this manner of proceeding is that the ECJ can fit human
nghts requirements to the Community legal order, which of course has its
special characteristics. This may seem stränge since human rights are usually
seen as the highest values of human civilization, which cannot be adapted ad
Libidum to the demands of convenience. However, the actual judicial application
°f human rights shows that far from representing absolute and static notions,
human rights are always interrelated to the societies where they are applied."29
°- In Nold, supra note 8, the ECJ held that the rights on which the applicant sought to
re'y 'should, if necessary, be subject to certain limitations justified by the overall
objectives pursued by the Community' (p. 508). See also Wachauf, supra note 17,
which repeated Nold although the English translation this time remained closer to the,
more restrictive, French version of Nold: 'International treaties concerning the protec-
tion of human rights (...) can also supply guidelines to which regard should be had
w the context of Community law ['des indications dont il convient de tenir compte']
(•••) The rights recognized by the Court are not absolute, however, but must be con-
sidered in relation to their social function' (emphasis added, p. 2639). In case 136/79,
National Panasonic v. Commission [1980] ECR 2057, the ECJ seemed to go a little
further by stating that it ensures the observance of fundamental rights 'in accordance
w<-th' human rights treaties. See also AG Van Gerven in Grogan, supra note 22, p.
4722.
y- One could point to the second paragraph of Arts. 8-11 ECHR, which allow for restric-
tions, provided of course that certain criteria are met. Likewise, the right to liberty (Art.
5) is subject to a number of restrictions. And even the interpretation of the seemingly
absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is
mfluenced in practice by prevailing convictions: see e.g. European Court of Human
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A more serious drawback of the ECJ's autonomous concept of fundamental
rights seems to be the unpredictability of its interpretation. This is an obvious
obstacle for the subjects of Community law who have a basic right to know
what their rights actually are. One might add that since the ECJ's fundamental
rights 'have virtually no legal certainty at all (...) it is hard to believe that they
have any conditioning effect whatsoever on public authorities in the Commu-
nity'.30
When we turn specifically to the interpretation of the ECHR, it will hardly
come as a surprise to find that the ECJ considers itself by no means obliged
to follow the case-law of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights. Advocate General Darmon summarized this position in the Orkem case-
(...) I must not fail to remind the Court that, according to its case-law, the existence in
Community law of fundamental rights drawn from the European Convention on Human
Rights does not derive from the wholly straightforward application of that instrument as
interpreted by the Strasbourg authorities. (...) The most authoritative commentators on
the judgments of this Court also emphasise that the Court's position regarding the
European Convention on Human Rights consists in most cases 'in using it merely as a
reference' even though it 'goes as far as possible in that direction' and that, by doing
so, it develops 'directly or indirectly its own case-law interpreting the Convention'.
This Court may therefore adopt, with respect to provisions of the Convention, an
interpretation which does not coincide exactly with that given by the Strasbourg author-
ities, in particular the European Court of Human Rights. It is not bound, in so far as it
does not have systematically to take into account, as regards fundamental rights under
Community law, the interpretation of the Convention given by the Strasbourg author-
Rights, Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1975, Series A No. 26, pp. 15-16, § 31 and
compare CosteUo-Roberts judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A No. 247-C, pp. 59-60,
§§ 30-33 to the joint dissenting opinion of four of the nine judges, p. 64. See on the
concept of human rights, as distinct from other entitlements: R. Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1991), esp. pp. 184-205, and several publications of J. Donnelly, e.g-
'Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions
of Human Rights', in American Political Science Review vol. 76 (1982), pp. 303-316.
30. Ph. Allott in his Memorandum presented to the House of Lords Select Committee on
the European Communities, supra note 4, p. 39. See already Mendelson, supra note 7,
p. 164.
31. Orkem, supra note 14, at pp. 3337-3338. See for a similar position AG Trabucchi in
Watson & Belmann, supra note 22, p. 1207, and A. Drzemczewski, 'The Domestic
Application of the European Human Rights Convention as European Community Law',
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 30 (1981), pp. 118-140, at p. 134.
Note that the AG in Orkem is careful: an ECJ interpretation does not have to coincide
'exactly' with the Strasbourg case-law. What about a radical difference? Would there
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fact t? D0t reaCt t0 this specific Submission of the Advocate General. In
Hoe h nSVer specified its Position vis-ä-vis the Strasbourg case-law. In the
obser H*!?6' When asked tO rule °n the SCOpe of Article 8 ECHR' the ECJ first
then at n° inference was t° be drawn from the text of that provision and
the F
COntmued: 'Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no case-law of
this thn?PrnT?°Urt of Human Ri^18 on that subject'.32 One could infer from
(anoth ; e.ECJ 1S Prepared to take into account case-law from Strasbourg
lotner guideline' ?), but no further elaboration is yet possible.
of a f |f
 uatlon is not without its dilemmas. If the ECJ interprets the contents
Rish lamental "ght in a way different from the European Court of Human
Luxern'h 'S & ̂  risk °f the authority of either the Strasbourg or the
bouro p 8 C°Urt being undermined-II would be rather painful for the Stras-
Practi Ï lf ltS case'law were ignored by the ECJ and the national legal
the ECTm BC Member States followed "e Luxembourg Court. Conversely,
of the PruDthe risk °f being criticized if it giyes a restrictive Interpretation
institut especially if the complaint is directed against a Community
a Preli ̂  ̂  lf " givCS a more extensive ruh'ng in response to a request for
thanth t2"7 mllng'il Wil1 force the national courts to apply a higher Standard
the ECHR033WhlCh thCy are b°Und °n the basis of their direct obh'gations under
Poses°rhld T take thiS problem seriously? The system of the ECHR presup-
human , ere are many (national) courts implicated in the protection of
°f the "l henCe k is inevitable that there will be different interpretations
States and principles involved.34 This is particularly true for the dualist
the nat^f8 tO the ECHR' which have not incorPorated the Convention, as
applvThn Judlciary is not obliged (and formally speaking even unable) to
f y we Convention as interpreted by the Commission and Court.35 This is
32 jf
 a"y 'egal objection?
ee Hoechst, supra note 12, p. 2924; see for a similar remark Orkem, supra note 14,
V- «U. We will come back to Hoechst, and to the correctness of the ECJ's observa-
33 "on, m §4.1.
34' ?; R- Lecourt, supra note 5, p. 338.
• the contribution of M. de Blois to this Über, 'The Fundamental Freedom of the
35. o, PeaD Court of Human Rights', pp. 35-59.
^ne should however not exaggerate the consequences of dualism; see H. Danelius,
e turopean Convention on Human Rights in the Case-law of the Supreme Court
see I / / " ' ' ̂  thiS Llber' PP' H3"12L With respect t0 the UK' or at least England,
[198019 w mS G°ld Und Silberscheideanstallt v- Customs & Excise Commissioners
of 90 IT 56L See als° Eur°Pean Court °f Human Rights, Vermeire judgment
co,S V'0vember 1991' Series A NO- 214-C, PP. 82-83, § 25: 'It cannot be seen what
'Q ftave prevented the Brussels Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation from
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not necessarily a problem. The ECHR only defines minimum Standards;
national authorities are free to apply a higher level of protection. Moreover,
the Convention - a 'living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of
present day conditions' - may even be said to benefit from the dialectics
between the courts involved in its application.36 But having said that, at the
end of the day it is Strasbourg which has the ultimate authority to give a
binding interpretation of the provisions of the ECHR. If an applicant is not
satisfied with the application of the ECHR by the national courts, hè can
exhaust local remedies and have his claim finally adjudicated by the European
Commission and eventually the European Court of Human Rights.
The crucial difference with respect to the ECJ's human rights case-law is
that this correction mechanism is missing. According to the current practice of
the European Commission of Human Rights, a complaint against a decision of
one of the Community institutions will be declared inadmissible ratione
personae as the Community as such has not (yet) formally acceded to the
ECHR.37 Likewise, to date, all complaints against Community Member States
implementing EC decisions (including judgments of the ECJ) which allegedly
violated human rights, have been declared inadmissible.38 Thus, if the ECJ
complying with the findings of the Marckx judgment'.
36. The quotation is taken from Tyrer, supra note 29, p. 15, § 31. See with specifïc
reference to the ECJ's potential input, M.H. Mendelson, 'The Impact of European
Community Law on the Implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights', in Y.E.L. vol. 3 (1983), pp. 99-126, at pp. 121-125. Indeed, it can be observed
that the Strasbourg bodies refer relatively often to the ECJ's case-law; see e.g. Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, ?•
26, § 58, and the cases referred to in § 4.1 infra.
37. See, inter alia, Appl. No. 8030/77, C.F.D.T. v. European Communities, Dec. 10.7.1978,
D.R. 13, p. 231; Appl. No. 13539/88, Dufay v. European Communities, Dec. 19.1.1989.
See on the C.F.D.T. case: E.A. Alkema, 'The EC and the European Convention on
Human Rights - Immunity and Impunity for the Community?', in CML Rev. vol. 16
(1979), pp. 498-508 and Mendelson, supra note 36, pp. 112-121.
38. See notably Appl. No. 13258/87, M. & Co., Dec. 9.2.1990, D.R. 64, pp. 138-145. This
unfortunate decision is the second paradoxical result of the ECJ's huraan rights case-
law (cf. note 6 supra) as it fended off the scrutiny of the ECHR organs in the short
term as well: the ECJ's human rights case-law was an important aspect in the decision
of the European Commission of Human Rights to declare inadmissible ratione materiae
complaints against Community Member States implementing EC decisions which
allegedly violated human rights (see M. & Co. p. 145). See for a recent and general
review of the Commission's case-law vis-ä-vis the Community and its Member States:
L. Weitzel, 'La Commission européenne des Droits de rHomme et Ie Droit commu-
nautaire', in R. Ergec et al. (eds.), Présence du Droit public et des Droits de l'Homme
(Mélanges offerts a Jacques Velu) (1992), pp. 1391-1406.
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aus to live up to the minimum Standards guaranteed in the ECHR, no remedy
would be available. The Member States might face difficulties at domestic level
and perhaps, if the European Commission of Human Rights were to change its
Position, also with respect to their international obligations. However, as the
aw stands, the Community as such, despite its growing powers, enjoys an
mimunity which one would not expect in post-Berlin Wall Europe.
These observations support the view that it cannot be maintained that the
ommunity as such is bound by the human rights provisions in national
constitutions or by treaties like the ECHR, despite assertions to the contrary.
n the 1970's, the EC Commission, while submitting its observations on cases
before the ECJ, explicitly suggested that the ECHR was legally binding upon
"ie Community.40 The ECJ ignored the invitation to pronounce on the issue.
n *act> if the concept of 'being bound' is to have any meaning, the arrogated
reedom of the ECJ in combination with the lack of remedies41 in Strasbourg
Plead against the assumption that the ECHR is binding upon the Community,
esPite the avowed willingness of its institutions to abide by its Substantive
Provisions.
Does this mean that the ECHR is binding only if there is a possibility to
raise a complaint in Strasbourg? Of course, a State can ratify the ECHR, and
hus be bound by it, without accepting the competence of the Human Rights
ornmission to receive individual complaints.42 So apparently, a State (or an
lnternational organization like the Community) can be bound by the ECHR
though actual enforcement measures may be lacking. One should not over-
°°k, however, the possibility of an inter-State complaint which is not depend-
• See on this H.G. Schermers, 'The European Communities Bound by Fundamental
Human Rights', in CML Rev. vol. 27 (1990), pp. 249-258, at pp. 257-258. The M. &
Co. decision has been criticized by the President of the European Court of Human
Rights(l): R. Ryssdal, 'On the Road to a European Constitutional Court', in Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law Vol. II Book 2 (1991), p. 12. See also the
contribution of G. Cohen-Jonathan to this Liber, 'Les rapports entre la Convention
européenne des Droits de l'Homme et les autres traites conclus par les Etats Parties',
PP. 79-111.
4°- See case 48/75, Royer [1976] ECR 506-507 and Watson & Belmann, supra note 22,
P. 1194.
41 <?• oee on the importance of legal remedies also the Opinion of AG Van Gerven in case
C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council [1990] ECR 1-2061.
2- See Art. 25 ECHR. All parties to the ECHR have now accepted the individual right
to cornplain and this can be considered as the acquis of the ECHR; but see on the
Turkish 'declaration' under Art. 25: Appl. No. 15318/89,Loz'ziWoM v. Turkey (Commis-
sion Report adopted on 8 July 1993; the case is now pending before the Court, having
been brought before it by Cyprus pursuant to Art. 48 (b) ECHR).
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ent upon separate acceptance upon ratification (Article 24 ECHR). This co"1'
plaint mechanism, although seldom used, might be seen as the specific expreS
sion of international responsibility for violations of international Obligation8'
This brings us to the essence of the argument. The international
is lacking. Neither the Community nor its Member States have ever
that they considered the Community bound to the ECHR. Hence, the 'consefl'
to be boand', within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law d
Treaties, is lacking. Article F § 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which a'
first sight settles the human rights issue, is another unilateral declaration
the Union will respect 'fundamental' rights 'as general principles of Commu
law'.
The question has been raised whether it is still necessary to express the
consent to be bound, as most States creating the Community were already
bound by the ECHR. As Pescatore said, relying on the concept of state suc-
cession: 'On n'adhère pas ä ce qui est déja en vigueur'.43 One counter-argu-
ment against this proposition is that it is apparently not shared by the ECJ, nor,
as we have just seen, by the European Commission of Human Rights.44 Ofl
a more theoretical level, it should be observed that his Submission could only
explain that the Community is bound to the human rights obligations which
were in existence in the 1950's, when the Communities were created. The
different legal regimes then applying to the Member States (in terras of reserva-
tions, acceptance of the right of individual complaint and jurisdiction of Ü$
Court; France had not yet ratified the Convention) would thus raise a problem.
And what about the Protocols to the Convention which were adopted at a later
date? Moreover, the position taken by Pescatore fails to answer the question
whether the Interpretation of the ECHR by the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights is also binding on the Community. Yet, it is precisely
43. See P. Pescatore, 'La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes et la Conventie11
européene des Droits de l'Homme', in Matscher & Petzold, supra note 5, pp. 441-455
at p. 441. See for similar arguments H.G. Schermers, supra note 39, at p. 251 and tltf
comments on the Commission's accession proposal by the Dutch section of tltf
International Commission of Jurists, NJCM, NJCM-bulletin vol. 16 (1991), pp. 697-73'
at p. 700. Lenaerts submits that the Community is bound by the ECHR, but hè does
not indicate on which ground and hè seems to have a rather broad understanding °'
this term as hè explains his statement as follows: 'The Community is indeed no paw
to the ECHR, but considers itself bound by it inside its own legal order' (K. Lenaer'8'
'Fundamental Rights to be Included in a Community Catalogue', in European L^
Review (E.L.R.) vel. 16 (1991), pp. 367-390 at p. 373, note 24; emphasis added).
44. Interestingly, Pescatore limits his Submission to 'les dispositions materielles de 'a
Convention', without explaining why the procedural provisions are not included in Ö16
Community's heritage.
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is - dynamic - case-law which has eiven the ECHR its distinctive impact and
Cuaracter.45
th p ld one saY that the Community would be bound by the ECHR if both
e ECJ and the European Commission of Human Rights were to adopt differ-
~nt attitudes, i.e. if the ECJ were to accept expressly the authority of the Stras-
bourg interpretations and the Human Rights Commission would in turn consider
c°rnplaints brought against the Community? The Community could then be
considered to be bound de facto by the ECHR and the problems mentioned in
ls Paragraph would by and large disappear. However, even this, hypothetical,
Nation could be simply reversed by a new decision of one of the judicial
. Oc}ies involved. Only accession to the ECHR would unequivocally resolve the
IQQii» 46 J
But the accession proposal has not yet been adopted, and the ECJ has never
explicitly accepted the authority of Strasbourg interpretations. Against this
background, it is worthwhile to recall the ERT judgment where the ECJ ruled:
(•••) where [national] rules do fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is
"Wßae to the Court ïor a preViminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria of Interpreta-
tion needecl by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with
the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures and which derive in
Particular from the European Convention on Human Rights.47
TV)lnus the Situation may occur, and indeed does occur, that the ECJ is called
uPon to interpret a provision of the ECHR. The resulting judgment may be at
variance with the Strasbourg case-law. Yet, the national court will be obliged
0 foll°w the ruling of the ECJ.48
Obviously, the Interpretation of the Convention has evolved since the 1950s; see e.g.
the Marckx case, supra note 36, pp. 19-20, § 41; Tyrer case, supra note 36, pp. 15-16,
§ 31 and B. v. France judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A No. 232-C, pp. 48-49,
§§ 46-48.
Much has been written on the advantages and disadvantages of accession. See for two
recent discussions: F.G. Jacobs, 'European Community law and the European Conven-
ll°n on Human Rights', in Curtin & Heukels, supra note 16, and J.P. Jacqué, 'The
Convention and the European Communities', in R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H.
petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (1993), pp.
41
 889-907.
48 J'^gment, supra note 15, p. 2964.1 cannot resist emphasising the word 'derive'.
"• Prelirninary ruling is binding on the national court hearing the case for which the
ectsion is given; see Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 8, p. 439, referring to case
29/68, Milchkontor v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken [1969] ECR 180. See also A.G. Toth,
rhe Authority of Judgments of the ECJ: Binding Force and Legal Effects' in Y.E.L.
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If we combine this observation and the conclusion of § 2, i.e. that the
number of human rights cases brought before the ECJ faas expanded and is
likely to increase, it is obvious that we have a potential problem here. We wil'
return to this in § 5. Let us first see whether it is realistic at all to speculaW
about diverging interpretations of the ECHR.
4. Diverging Interpretations? Recent Case-law Examined
Comparisons between the ECJ's human rights case-law and the Strasbourg
jurisprudence have been made before. Indeed, on several occasions it has been
claimed that the Luxembourg interpretation of Convention provisions deviateo
from that in Strasbourg.
It was argued, for example, that the ECJ misinterpreted Article 7 ECHR i"
the case of several Spanish fishermen.49 The House of Lords Select Committee
on the European Communities, an unimpeachable authority in this respect>
considered that the ECJ's ruling in Musique Diffusion Frangaise was 'inconSJS'
tent with the jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court of Huffla11
Rights' in so far as it held that the EC Commission is not subject to Articl6
6 ECHR when acting in the field of competition law.50 In the Orkem case.
the ECJ rejected the claim that Article 6 ECHR includes the right not to giye
evidence against oneself, a position which recently appeared to conflict with
the Strasbourg point of view.51 Finally, in the well-known Grogan case, the
Irish High Court requested a preliminary ruling on the question whether afl
injunction, prohibiting the dissemination of information about lawful abortiofl
facilities abroad, would be compatible with Community law. Advocate General
Van Gerven reviewed the question both under Community law strictu sensü
and under Article 10 ECHR. He held that an injunction would not be in breach
vol. 4 (1984), pp. 1-79.
49. R.R. Churchill & N.G. Poster, 'Double Standards in Human Rights? The Treatrnent
of Spanish Fishermen by the European Community', in E.L.R. vol. 12 (1987), pp. 430-
443.
50. House of Lords, supra note 4, p. 33, referring to joined cases 100-103/80, SA Musiq^
Diffusion Franyaise a.o. v. Commission [1983] ECR 1880. See for an extensive
discussion M.B.W. Biesheuvel, 'Artikel 6 ECRM en het gemeenschapsrecht', in S.E. $•
vol. l1 (1988), pp. 659-705 and, recently, X.A. de Mello, 'Droit de la concurrence e'
droits de l'hornme', in RTDE vol. 29 (1993), pp. 601-633.
51. Compare Orkem, supra note 14, at p. 3350, and European Court of Human RigMs'
Funke judgment of 25 February 1993, Series A No. 256-A, § 44. See D. Curtin,
'Constitutionalism in the European Community - The Right to Fair Procedures i"
Administrative Law', in O'Reilly, supra note 24, pp. 293-317.
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„ Article 10. The ECJ, however, avoided giving a Substantive ruling.52
ubsequently it appeared, in the case of Open Door Counselling, that the
vocate General's opinion not only contrasted with the conclusions of the
. "man Rights Commission (adopted before the Opinion) but also with the
st lfment °f the Court (delivered after the ECJ judgment).53 The issues at
e ln the two cases were so similar that they cannot be distinguished from
orrnative point of view. Given the nature of the issues involved, it is perhaps
ardly surprising that the Advocate General and Strasbourg arrived at different
nclusions. Nevertheless, the Irish abortion cases provide another example of
lverging interpretations of the Convention.
kven this brief review could lead to the conclusion that divergencies appar-
v occur. Even assuming that the ECJ is willing to follow the Interpretation
pp European Court of Human Rights, divergencies are possible when the
. ^J is asked to rule on a provision of the ECHR of which no Strasbourg
mterPretation is available yet.
In 1987, the conclusion could still be drawn that 'really very little reliance
as actually been made on the ECHR'.54 However, as we have seen, the case-
w of the ECJ has developed considerably over the last few years. It is there-
°re worthwhile periodically reviewing whether the coexistence of two Euro-
Pean courts, each involved in the application (and necessarily the Interpretation)
the ECHR, leads to any new complications. The following section will
arnine two situations in which more or less comparable cases came before
e ECJ and the Convention organs. All cases related to the interpretation of
. rticle 8 of the Convention, but they differed profoundly as to the Substantive
SUes involved. In § 4. l the right to privacy for companies in competition law
Procedures is at stake; in § 4.2 we shall focus on the right of a migrating
°nununity national to have his name spelled correctly.
^
5~ Grogan, supra note 22, at pp. 4727 (AG) and 4740 (ECJ).
• Reporl of the European Commission of Human Rights, Appl. No. 14234/88 and
14235/88, adopted 7 March 1991; European Court of Human Rights, Open Door and
Dublin Well Woman judgment of 29 October 1992, Series A No. 246-A. See for a more
extensive review of the cases and the comments: R.A. Lawson, 'The Irish Abortion
Cases: European Limits to National Sovereignty?', to appear in European Journal of
Health Law vol. l (1994).
' N. Poster, 'The European Court of Justice and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights', in Human Rights Law Journal vol. 8 (1987), pp. 245-272,
at p. 270.
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4.1. Legal Persons and the Scope of the Right to Respect for Private Life
Regulation No. 17 of 196255 gives the EC Commission relatively wide powers
in order to supervise compliance with the rules of competition law. For obvious
reasons, the gathering of information is of crucial importance for the EC
Commission in this context. Under Article 11 of Regulation No. 17, companies
can be obliged to submit information at the Commission's request and, accord-
ing to Article 14, the Commission can inspect the premises and the archives
of companies. If the company does not cooperate, Article 14 § 6 even allows
the Commission to carry out a search in cooperation with the national author-
ities. The following discussion will focus upon the ECJ's response to those
companies which sought to rely on the right to respect for private life (Article
8 ECHR) as a means of limiting the Commission's power to conduct searches
in the business premises.
At first sight, it may seem stränge that companies try to invoke human
rights. Nevertheless, legal persons have complained in Strasbourg comperatively
frequently and often successfully.56 Admittedly, some rights by definition do
not apply to legal persons as they are directed specifically to the human being.
The right to life is an obvious example. Likewise, it is not to be expected that
two companies, wishing to merge, invoke the right to niarry. However, there
are other rights, such as the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's property,
which are more suitable for application to legal persons. The better position
therefore would seem to be that the applicability of a given right depends on
the nature of the person and that of the right.57 Moreover, in contemporary
Western society, many human rights norms are developing into genera! stan-
55. OJ, Special English Edition 1959-1962, p. 87. See in general P.J. Kuyper & T.P.J.N.
van Rijn, 'Procedural Guarantees and Investigating Methods in European Law, with
Special Reference to Competition', in Y.E.L vol. 2 (1982), pp. 1-55.
56. Art. 25 ECHR provides that 'any non-governmental organization' can petition the
Commission. See for a famous example, among many others, European Court of
Human Rights, Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A No. 30. In the Open
Door case, Open Door Counselling Ltd. did not only complain (successfully) under
Art. 10, but also under Art. 8 - see the Commission's Report annexed to the Court
judgment, supra note 53, p. 54, § 40. The Commission observed that 'Open Door
Counselling Ltd. itself had not made out a case that it had any private life which feil
wilhin the protection of Article 8 ECHR or with which there had been any interference'
(p. 61, § 64). The complaint was not declared inadmissible ratione materiae but the
Commission concluded that Art. 8 had not been violated in respect of the company.
The possibility that Art. 8 applied was thus explicitly left open.
57. See already K. Vasak, La Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme (1964), p.
77.
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dards of good governance. The right to a fair trial, as protected by Article 6
ECHR, is a case in point. These Standards apply to any government action and
the question whether the object of this action is a human being or a legal
person acquires secondary importance. The question to be addressed is thus
whether the right to privacy lends itself to application to companies.58
In 1979, the EC Commission inspected the premises of the United Kingdom
subsidiary of National Panasonic. The inspection lasted some seven hours, and
was, for a large part, carried out in the absence of the Company's solicitor.
Before the ECJ, Panasonic relied, inter alia, on the right to privacy as protected
by Article 8 ECHR.59 It submitted that this right imposes upon the Com-
mission the duty to give advance notice of its intention to carry out an investi-
gation. The Commission expressed some doubts as to whether the right to
privacy also applied to legal persons. But even assuming that it did, the Com-
mission found that it did not include a right to prior notice of an investigation.
Any prior warning would of course risk jeopardising the effectiveness of the
investigation. The Commission emphasised that the effects of the inspections
were not as drastic and damaging as Panasonic had suggested, as 'inspectors
decide nothing and draw no conclusions'.60
In his Opinion, Advocate General Warner recalled the early Brescia case
m which, on his reading, the ECJ had 'clearly considered that the right to
privacy extends to business premises, whether those of an individual or of a
Company'. But hè agreed with the Commission that a right to advance notice
or. an investigation could not be derived from Article 8 ECHR. He remarked
8. l his question has been disputed in the past; compare H. Guradze, Die Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention (1968), p. 118 ('Träger des rechts kann nur eine natürliche
Person sein') and J. Velu, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right
to Respect for Private Life, the Home and Communications', in A.H. Robertson (ed.),
Privacy and Human Rights (1973), pp. 12-128, at p. 19 ('This Statement seems to me
too categorical. (...) a building in which a trading Company has its registered office,
its management and its offices is considered its home'); repeated in J. Velu & R.
Ergec, La Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme (1990), p. 532; J.A. Frowein
& W. Peukert, Europäische MenschenRechtsKonvention (1985), p. 207 ('Dagegen
können Betriebsräume, anders als im deutschen Verfassungsrecht, nicht zur Wohnung
gezählt werden').
59. National Panasonic, supra note 28, at p. 2044.
60. Ibidem, at p. 2046.
61. Ibidem, p. 2068, referring to case 31/59, Acclaieria e Tubiflcio di Brescia v. High
Authority [1960] ECR 80. In fact, the ECJ mcrely referred, almost in passing, to
'inspections, capable of affecting the area of individual liberty and of departing from
the principle of the inviolability of private premises', without making any further
comments.
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that it was 'soraewhat unusual' that the Commission was 'empowered to
proceed without any sort of warrant frora a judicial authority', whereas the laws
of most Member States require officers of a public authority be in possessioü
of a warrant before they enter private premises. He did not, however, draw anj
conclusions from this observation. In its judgment, the ECJ repeated its familial
Nold formula and held:
In this respect it is necessary to point out that Article 8 (2) of the European Convention
in so f ar as it applies to l egal persons, whilst stating the principle that public authoritieï
should not interfere with the exercise of the rights referred to in Article 8(1), acknowl-
edges that such interference is permissible to the extent to which it is 'in accordance witli
the law and is necessary in a democratie society for the economie well-being of the
country (...)'.
In this instance, as follows from the seventh and eighth recitals of the preamble
to Regulation No. 17, the aim of the powers given to the Commission by Article 14 o/
that regulation is to enable it to carry out its duty under the EEC Treaty of ensuring thal
the rules on competition are applied in the common market. The function of these rules
is (...) to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest
individual undertakings and consumers. The exercise of the powers given to the Commis-
sion by Regulation No. 17 contributes to the maintenance of the System of competition
intended by the Treaty which undertakings are absolutely bound to comply with. In these
circumstances, it does therefore not appear that Regulation No. 17, by giving the
Commission the powers to carry out investigations without previous notifïcation, infringes
the right invoked by the applicant.62
The ECJ thus left undecided whether a legal person could rely on the right to
privacy. More importantly, it applied a very general and abstract test to deter-
mine if the Commission had respected this right. In fact, the ECJ merely argued
that the interference with the (assumed) private life of Panasonic had a 'legit-
imate aim', as required by the ECHR. Whether the investigation had actually
been 'necessary in a democratie society' was left unanswered. As a seperate
issue, the ECJ did entertain the complaint that the investigation had been
disproportionate, but dismissed it on essentially the same ground as the com-
plaint under Article 8 ECHR:
Considering that the contested decision aimed solely at enabling the Commission to
collect the necessary information to appraise whether there was any infringement of the
Treaty, it does not therefore appear that the Commission's action in this instance was
62. Ibidem, p. 2057, emphasis added.
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disproportionate to the objective pursued and therefore violate the principle of
proportionality.63
Again, the Court applied a very general and abstract test. Apparently, the way
in which the search was actually executed was not a relevant factor in its
assessment. A similar approach was followed in the AKZO case, a few years
later. In that case, the applicant Company relied on Article 8 ECHR, but limited
its argument somewhat surprisingly to the position that this provision requires
the Commission to comply with the requirements of Article 14 of Regulation
No. 17 itself. The Court had no great difficulty in dealing with this rather
superfluous claim: as it had already found that Regulation No. 17 itself had
been complied with, the Submission could easily be rejected.64
A more convincing claim under Article 8 ECHR was made in the Hoechst
case. As the Commission suspected that agreements concerning the fixing of
prices and delivery quotas for certain plastics were being executed, it decided
to carry out an investigation into several undertakings in January 1987, includ-
ing Hoechst. However, Hoechst refused to cooperate with the inspection which
it considered unlawful given the lack of a warrant. As the Company persisted
in its refusal, the Commission imposed a fine of Ecu 1000 for each day of
delay. The search was finally carried out in April 1987, after the Bundeskartell-
amt had obtained a search warrant from the local Amtsgericht.
Before the Court, Hoechst sought to rely on the right to inviolability of the
home, as protected by Article 8 ECHR.65 Hoechst submitted that for a search
to be lawful, it was necessary that the Commission have a court order, issued
by the ECJ and specifying the limits of the search in detail. The Commission
expressed no doubts as to the scope of Article 8 and accepted 'that, in prin-
ciple, it also applies to the business premises of legal persons, that any
encroachment on that right by the public authorities must be provided for by
law and that, in principle, searches can be made only on the basis of a court
decision'. The Commission argued, however, that the court review could also
take place after the investigation.66
63. Ibidem, p. 2060, emphasis added.
64. Case 5/85, AKZO Chemie v. Commission [1986] ECR 2612-2613. In nis Opinion, AG
Lenz came to the same conclusion. He added, apparently on its own motion, that 'Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention does not require that the inttrference by a public authority with
the exercise of that right should have been previously authorized by another, indepen-
dent body' (ibidem, p. 2603).
65. Hoechst, supra note 12, at p. 2868.
66. Ibidem, p. 2870. The Commission had already accepted that Art. 8 can apply to legal
persons in AKZO, supra note 64, at p. 2603.
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Advocate General Mischo, after having reviewed Member State practice in
relation to the protection of the home and the extent to which this right includes
business premises, observed 'a general trend in the national legal Systems
towards the assimilation of business premises to a home' and hè invited the
Court to expressly accept that there is a fundamental right at Community level
to the inviolability of business premises.67 At the same time, hè acknowledged
that the protection afforded to business premises is not equal to that of a private
dwelling; in the present case he did not find a violation. He expressed his
support for the Suggestion of Hoechst, that the Commission should avail itself
of a 'European search warrant', to be issued by the ECJ prior to an investiga-
tion. He referred in this respect to the comparable procedure under Article 81
of the Euratom Treaty. In its judgment of September 1989, the ECJ held:
(...) it should be observed that, although the existence of [the fundamental right to the
inviolability of the home] must be recognized in the Community legal order as a principle
common to the laws of the Member States in regard to the private dwellings of natural
persons, the same is not true in regard to undertakings, because there are not inconsider-
able divergencies between the legal Systems of the Member States in regard to the nature
and degree of protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the public
authorities.
No other inference is to be drawn from Article 8(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights which provides that: 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence'. The protective scope of that article
is concerned with the development of man's personal freedom and may not therefore be
extended to business premises. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no case-law
of the European Court of Human Rights on that subject.
However, the Court continued:
None the less, in all the legal Systems of the Member States, any intervention by the
public authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether natural or
legal, must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law, and,
consequently, those Systems provide, albeit it in different forms, protection against
arbitrary or disproportionate intervention. The need for such protection must be recog-
nized as a general principle of Community law.68
67. Hoechst, supra note 12, p. 2893.
68. Ibidem, p. 2924. The same consideration can be found in the related judgments in case
85/87, Dow Benelux NV v. Commission [1989] ECR 3157 and joined cases 97-99/87,
Dow Ibérica SA and Others v. Commission [1989] ECR 3185-3186. The Commission
distinguished the latter case as Dow 'had submitted to the investigation without the
slightest objection' (p. 3176).
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In the following considerations, the ECJ on the one hand stressed the 'very
wide' powers of the Commission's officials, but on the other hand defined
certain conditions to which investigations are subjected. One of the require-
ments is that the decision taken under Article 14(3) specifies the subject matter
and purpose of the investigation to 'enable those undertakings to assess the
scope of their duty to cooperate while at the same safeguarding the rights of
the defence'. Other requirements depend on the attitude of the Company and
the procedure adopted by the Commission in response.
The question to be pursued here is of course: was the Court right in its
Interpretation of Article 8? The absolute exclusion of companies from the scope
of protection of Article 8 could be considered as a departure from the existing
case-law: Panasonic had left the matter open, but with some imagination the
early Brescw case could be seen as extending the right to privacy to legal
persons. For the purpose of the present review, however, it is not so much the
consistency of the ECJ's own case-law, but its relationship with the jurispru-
dence of the Strasbourg organs which is of interest. Indeed, shortly after the
Hoechstjudgment, the ECJ was criticized for having overlooked the Chapell
case, which had been decided by the European Court of Human Rights a few
months earlier.
In Chappell, z surprise investigation was carried out in the premises of a
Company, distributing video cassettes which had been made in breach of
copyright. Durmg the search, the authorities also entered the bedroom of the
Company s owner which happened to be located in the same building, and
allegedly serzed private correspondence. Before the Commission and Court of
Human Rights, Mr Chappell complained of a violation of Article 8. In the
pioceedings, the UK government accepted that there had been an 'interference'
with^he exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his 'private life' and
It has been submitted in the literature that the ECHR organs in this case
extended the protection of Article 8 to legal persons.70 That statement, how-
ever, appears to be too optimistic: although the search was directed against Mr
Cnappell s Company, and the ECHR bodies also examined the search in so far
as it alrected the Company, it was basically the applicant's own private life and
home which formed the heart of the complaint.71 The judgment nevertheless
is relevant for our present discussion, as the Court explicitly held that it
69. European Court of Human Rights, Chappell judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A No.
70. See I.G.F. Cath, 'Hebben ondernemingen recht op bescherming van de privésfeer? De
zaken Hoechst en Chappell vergeleken' in MCM-bulletin vol. 16 (1991), pp. 28-54.
71. This is especially clcar from the Commission's Report, annexed to the Court's judg-
ment, supra note 69, p. 29, § 96.
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'entertains no doubt that the actual grant of the order [permitting the surprise
investigation] was a necessary step in the effective pursuit by [two film com-
panies and two copyright bureaus] of their copyright action'.72 This finding
confirms the ECJ's 1980 Panasonic judgment, discussed above, when it had
refused to accept that the right to privacy includes a right to prior warning of
an inspection. Finally, the Chappell judgment is important because the Court
did not satisfy itself with an abstract review of the legal system relating to
searches: it also examined whether the actual execution of the order was
'necessary in a democratie society' and, in particular, whether it was propor-
tionale to the legitimate aim pursued. On the facts of the case, the Court found
no violation of Article 8, although it expressed some hesitations.
Much stronger arguments that the ECJ had misinterpreted Article 8 in
Hoechst were provided a few months later, when the Strasbourg Court delivered
its Niemietz judgment. In this case the German authorities had instituted
criminal procedures against a person who, under a false name, had written an
insulting letter to a trial judge. Hoping to find indications of the author's
identity in the law office of Mr Niemietz, the Public Prosecutor's Office
requested and obtained a warrant to search his office. Both the Human Rights
Commission and the Court were unanimous in finding a violation of Article
8. After having cited the ECJ's judgment in Hoechst, the Court held with
respect to the applicability of Article 8:
(...) it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of 'private life'] to an 'inner circle'
in which the individual may live his own personal life as hè chooses and to exclude
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. (...) There
appears, furthermore, to be no reason or principle why this understanding of the notion
of 'private life' should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature
(...) As regards the word 'home', appearing in the English text of Article 8, the Court
observes that in certain Contracting States, notably Germany (...), it has been accepted
as extending to business premises. Such an interpretation is, moreover, fully consonant
with the French text, since the word 'domicile' has a broader connotation than the word
'home' and may extend, for example, to a professional person's office (...). More
generally, to interpret the words 'private life' and 'home' as including certain professional
or business activities or premises would be consonant with the essential object and
purpose of Article 8, namely to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by
the public authorities (...). Such an interpretation would not unduly hamper the Contract-
ing States, for they would retain their entitlement to 'interfere' to the extent permitted
by paragraph 2 of Article 8; that entitlement might well be more far-reaching where
72. Ibidem, p. 25, § 59.
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professional or business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be
the case.73
The Court did not say that legal persons as such have a right to privacy - a
question which was not relevant to the case as the applicant was an individual.
Nevertheless, the observation that Article 8 includes 'certain' professional or
business activities or premises comes close to the de facto recognition of a right
to privacy for legal entities.
When reviewing the execution of the search in Mr Niemietz' office, the
Court held that the interference was not 'necessary in a democratie society',
and was therefore in violation of Article 8. Both the warrant and the way in
which the search was actually carried out were considered disproportionate for
reasons which are highly relevant to the ECJ's case-law as well:
the warrant was drawn in broad terms, in that it ordered a search for and seizure of
'documents' without any limitation, revealing the identity of the author of the offensive
letter; this point is of special significance where, as in Germany, the search of a lawyer's
office is not accompanied by any special procedural safeguards, such as the presence of
an independent observer. More importantly, having regard to the materials that were in
fact mspected, the search impinged on professional secrecy to an extent that appears
disproporüonate m the circumstances; it has, in this connection, to be recalled that, where
a lawyer is involved, an encroachment on professional secrecy may have repercussions
on the proper admimstration of justice and hence on the rights guaranteed by Article 6
of the Convention. In addition, the attendant publicity must have been capable of
affectmg adversely the applicant's professional reputation, in the eyes both of his existing
clients and of the public at large.
The easiest conclusion to be derived from the above is that the ECJ was plainly
wrong m Hoechst when it concluded 'somewhat hastily'74 that the protective
scope or Article 8 'is concerned with the development of man's personal
freedom and may not therefore be extended to business premises'. The Stras-
bourg Court explicitlv cited, and implicitly criticized, these considerations in
lts Niemietz judgment.
73. European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz judgment of 16 December 1992, Series
A No. 251, pp. 33-34, §§ 29-31.
74. G. Cohen-Jonathan, 'Respect for Private and Faniily Life', in R.St J Macdonald F
Matscher & H. Petzold, supra note 46, pp. 405-444, at p. 428. But see the annotation
of M.R. Mok (S.E.W. vol. 38 (1990), pp. 381-397), stating that there is no reason to
assume that the Strasbourg Court will extend the notion of 'home' to professional
premises (at p. 396).
75. It will also be noted that in Niemietz the absence of legal steps against the lawyer,
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To a large extent, however, this play on words is not the genuine issue
What really matters is the level of protection actually offered. After all, i)
Hoechst the ECJ declined to apply Article 8 to companies, but at the same timi
it was prepared to afford 'protection against arbitrary or disproportionati
intervention' as a general principle of Community law. The question to b(
solved is thus, whether this general principle would satisfy the test ofNiemietz
It is submitted that this is at least doubtful. In Nietnietz, the Court found th<
search disproportionate as a result of three factors, at least two of which appea
to be inherent in searches carried out by the EC Commission under Regulatioi
No. 17:
(1) the warrant was drawn in brood terms, in that it ordered a search f or anc
seizure of 'documents' without any limitaüon. It appears that similarlj
broad investigation orders are used by the EC Commission. In the Pana-
sonic case, the Commission decision only stated that 'a decision must be
adopted requiring National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. to submit to an investiga-
tion and to produce the requisite business records'.76 Apparently this was
not an exceptionally drafted decision. In Hoechst, Advocate Genera)
Mischo observed that in general 'the terms of the decisions ordering the
investigations contain no precise details as to the specific documents which
the Commission's officials are to examine. Reference is made solely te
"business documents related to the subject of the enquiry'".77 Common
sense dictates that the authorities can hardly foresee exactly which docu-
ments will be found. Nevertheless, the very general terms used by the
Commission do not seem to offer sufficient guarantees against 'fishing
expeditions', and may therefore not pass the Niemietz test.
(2) the search was not accompanied by any special procedural safeguards,
such as the presence of an independent observer. The same is true for
Community investigations. As we have seen, the inspection in Panasonic
was even carried out to a large extent in the absence of the Company's
solicitor. If a Company opposes a Commission visit, Article 14 § 6 of
Regulation No. 17 provides that the Commission officials may nevertheless
search for information 'with the assistance of the national authorities'.
following the search of his office, was not a factor in determining whether there was
a violation of the Convention. 'The inspectors decide nothing and draw no conclu-
sions', the EC Commission submitted in Panasonic, supra note 60, but from the
perspective of Art. 8 that is not particularly relevant.
76. Ibidem, p. 2063.
77. Hoechst, supra note 12, p. 2878. In its judgment, the ECJ criticized the Commission's
decision providing for the inspection; the Court held that the Commission is required
to 'clearly indicate the presumed facts which it intends to investigate' (ibidem at p.
2930).
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Whether 'an independent observer' will attend the search will vary from
country to country, as it is for each Member State to determine the condi-
tions under which assistance to the Commission's officials will be
afforded.781 do not think, however, that, for example, the presence of two
members of the Bundeskartellamt as in the Hoechst case (or a represen-
tative of the Dutch government, as in the AKZO case) would satisfy the
requirements of the Niemietz case.
(3) 'more importantly', the search impinged on professional secrecy to an
extent that appeared disproporüonate in the circumstances, taking into
account that a lawyer was involved. These aspects were specific to the case
and they might, generally speaking, not be present when an 'ordinary'
company is searched. It should also be taken into account that the law
office of Mr Niemietz was very small; one could imagine that the right to
privacy can be restricted to an extent proportionale to the size of the
company involved.
The relative weight of these three factors requires further clarification. But it
may safely be assumed that the level of protection offered under Community
law as interpreted by the ECJ in Hoechst is a danger of falling below the
requirements of Article 8 ECHR. A fourth element not explicitly mentioned
in Niemietz follows from the very way in which the Human Rights Court
reviewed the case. It did not limit itself to examining the legal System of
searches in general and the aims the search was intended to serve. As in
Chappell, the Court reviewed the actual execution of the search as well. By
contrast, to date, the ECJ has refrained from reviewing the conduct of the
Commission's officials.
It could be argued that the Hoechst judgment, even if it was not entirely
correct, may not have posed insurmountable difficulties for the company
involved. However, its broader implications should not be overlooked. Quite
apart from the interests involved in competition cases in general, this particular
branch of law is one of the areas where the EC Commission enjoys relatively
wide powers. This makes strict compliance with the ECHR Standards all the
more important.
Niemietz, it might be added, was not a slip of the pen. In February 1993,
the Strasbourg Court adopted an identical position in three French cases.79 In
each of the cases the Court held:
78. Ibidem, p. 2928.
79. European Court of Human Rights, Funke, Crémieux and Miailhe judgments of 25
February 1993, Series A NOS. 256-A, 256-B and 256-C respectively.
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Undoubtedly, in the field under consideration - the prevention of capital outflows ai
tax evasion - States encounter serious difficulties owing to the scale and complexity
banking Systems and financial channels and to the immense scope for internation
investment, made all the easier by the relative porousness of national borders. The Cou
therefore recognizes that they may consider it necessary to have recourse to measun
such as house searches and seizures in order to obtain physical evidence of exchangi
control offences and, where appropriate, to prosecute those responsible. Nevertheles
the relevant legislation and practice must afford adequate and effective safeguards again:
abuse (...).
This was not so in the instant case. At the material time (...) the customs authoritie
had very wide powers; in particular, they had exclusive competence to assess th
expediency, number, length and scale of inspections. Above all, in the absence of an
requirement of a judicial warrant, the restrictions and conditions providedfor in law (...
appear too lax and füll of loopholes for the interferences in the applicant's right to havt
been strictly proportionale to the legitimate aim pursued. (emphasis added)
Thus it can be concluded that the Submission of Hoechst, that Article 8 requires
prior judicia] permission to conduct a search, appears to find support in the new
Strasbourg case-law.80 The EC Commission in this respect is answerable to
no one: like the French custom authorities, it does not have to show in advance
that it has reasonable grounds for carrying out an inspection but rather enjoys
exclusive competence in deciding when and where to act. As a system of
'European search warrants' has never been created, the question can be raised
whether Community law in this respect offers adequate safeguards against
arbitrary interferences, satisfying the ECHR requirements.81
Diverging interpretations? The ECJ' s Interpretation of Aitic\e S of xteECHR
\\as ptcwed to\)e incorrect on some points and doubtM on others. At the same
time, it should be realised that the ECJ adopted these interpretations before the
ECHR bodies gave their authoritative rulings. It is therefore not submitted thal
the ECJ deliberately tried to apply too low a level of human rights protection.
It will of course be very interesting to see what the ECJ's reaction to the new
Strasbourg case-law will be. The remark in Hoechst that there was no relevant
80 Likewise, the remark of Advocate General Lenz in AKZO, supra note 64, does not
seem to be justified. The Hoechst judgment was criticized as 'neither very coherent
nor very satisfying', especially on the point of prior judicial review of inspections, by
J.S. Forrester & C. Norrall, 'Competition Law', in Y.E.L. vol. 9 (1989), pp. 271-314,
at p. 303.
81 See, by way of analogy, on the importance of effective safeguards against arbitrary
interference with privacy (in casu telephone tapping): European Court of Human
Rights, Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A No. 28, pp. 22-28, esp. § 56
and Kruslin judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A No. 176, pp. 22-25, §§ 30-36.
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case-law of the European Court of Human Rights may indicate that the ECJ
is prepared to follow the new jurisprudence. But it is equally possible that there
will be a certam amount of pressure to water down some of the new Strasbourg
pnnciples m order not to risk to impair the effectiviness of the Commission's
powers After all, rights 'should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits
justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community' 82
Be that as it may, the observation, in 1982, that one 'may conclude without
rnuch hesitation that the rights of anyone affected by an anti-trust decision are
adequately guaranteed at a procedural level'83 is no longer justified.
4.2. The Right to a Name
Christos Konstantmidis, or rather Xpf,axo? KcovamvtivtSr,^ was a Greek
national estabhshed m Germany. He was engaged in a rather Kafka-esque
S? ̂  ? German authorities: they decided to change his name.
When Mr Konstantimdis married a German national, his name was entered
m the local marnage register as 'Konstadinidis', i.e. with a [d] instead of a [nt].
He apphed o the reglstry office for the entry of his surnaJe to be rectified.
As German legisJation demands that thf» r,^™ ± •, • ,
corresponds to the name on tneb rth Srtifïït" T ^
his Greek birth certificate translated bv f ff' ,
 auth°ntlesc i m   a uee  e r c a t f  ut „,,;to „,i,e,<- A/T v
  irans ted by  q ahfied translater. The outcome was
not quite what Mr Konstantmidis had ™™^A TU * i , i • ,
system for transliteration pursuant to a t ' ÏÏ ^ ̂ ^ 5
Greece are parties, decided ha" h S L V° ̂  b°ï ?*""%?
v- t v,t;r,;^5c' Q v, , name should be spelled as 'Hrestos
Konstantiiudes Subsequently, the competent authorities not merely refused
t\ve ïequesX oï MT Komtaitanidis Tom determined instead that his entry should
be brought m conformity with the newly obtained transliteration. Mr Konstanti-
nidis objected strongly to these developments and applied to the local Amts-
gericht. This court considcred lliat Kis rights under Community law might be
infringed if hè were compelled to write his name in a distorted way and
therefore decided to refer the matter for a preliminary ruling.
Advocate General Jacobs did not show great sympathy for the transliteration
system that led in the case of Mr Konstantinidis to 'an insulting, unpronounce-
able parody of his name'.84 Even if hè had not actually suffered prejudice
resulting from the obligatory transliteration - or deformation - of his name, 'the
inconvenience and unpleasantness thus inflicted on him are sufficient to entitle
Wm to invoke the prohibition laid down by the Treaty'. Quite apart from the
82' As the ECJ held in Nold, supra note K, p. 508
83' Kliypor & Van Rijn, supra note 55, p. 26.
®4. Konstantinidis, supra note 24.
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The European Court of Justice are conscientiously applying the Convention and the
'acquis' which flows from it. (...) there is no conflict between Community law and the
European Convention. None of our witnesses was able to point convincingly to a single
case where an individual had been denied justice in terms of the ECHR on complaining
of a Community action. This evidence tended to confirm our assessment in 1980 that
in the Community "the immediate practical gains of accession are likely to be limited"
and that accession would not significantly benefit the individual.93
The present review does not support these observations. But, with respect, it
could be asked whether the Select Committee answered the right question.
Should we really wait until there is manifest confusion or a direct conflict
between Strasbourg and Luxembourg? Would it not be preferable to settle the
relationships between the two Courts, to create a system of judicial co-oper-
ation94 on human rights issues, before they adopt overtly opposing views and
prestige becomes a major barrier to any solution? The preceding pages have
illustrated that at the very least the possibility of diverging interpretations is
real.
As Schermers said: 'Every State, every nation, in Europe has its own
Standard of morality. In that sense, we do not have an integrated Europe, but
we do have some common basis. There would be no Europe at all if there were
not some common features, some basic Standards, which are the same in all
countries'.95 These 'basic Standards', enshrined in the Convention and inter-
preted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, should apply
a fortiori to the Community - a Community which derives its very existence
from the European countries sharing these Standards.
93. House of Lords, supra note 4, p. 28.
94. See M.W. Janis, 'Fashioning a Mechanism for Judicial Cooperation on European
Human Rights Law Among Europe's Regional Courts', in this Über, pp. 211-217.
95. Address before the Court as delegate of the European Commission of Human Rights
in the Lingens case, European Court of Human Rights Series B No. 86, p. 137.
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more or less technical Community law aspects, the Advocate General maintains
that the treatment of Mr Konstantinidis amounts to a violation of his funda-
mental rights, notably the right to respect for a given name. This should not
be taken too lightly. 'To strip a person of his rightful name', Mr Jacobs sub-
mits, 'is the ultimate degradation'. He refers in this respect to several human
rights instruments and the constitutions of some of the Member States which
provide for an express recognition of the right to a name. With respect to the
ECHR, the Advocate General expresses his surprise about the omission of a
specific reference to the individual's right to his name and personal identity.
He limits his position to the remark that 'it ought to be possible, by means of
a broad interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, to arrive at the view that the Conven-
tion does indeed protect the individual's right to oppose unjustified interference
with his name'.
The judgment of the ECJ was drafted in a less emotive style. The ECJ held
that Community law is violated
if the law of the State of establishment obliges a Greek national to use for professional
purposes a spelling of his name resulting from transliteration in the registers of civil
status if that spelling is such that the pronunciation of the name is misrepresented and
such distortion exposes him to a risk of confusion of identity on the part of his potential
clients.85
It will be noted that the Court does not examine the Substantive result of a
particular transcription System. Rather, the 'risk of confusion of identity on the
part of potential clients' determines whether Community law has been violated.
The judgment is remarkably terse. Whereas in cases like Cinéthèque, Demirel
and Grogan the ECJ at least expressly refused to deal substantively with the
human rights aspects of the case, it ignored this dimension completely in the
Konstantinidis case.
How would the European Commission and Court of Human Rights have
reacted had the case been submitted to them? Was the position of the Advocate
General with respect to Article 8 ECHR correct? The provision does not refer
expressly to the right of individuals to respect for their name. Yet, as was
illustrated in § 4.1, the supervisory organs of the ECHR have often been
prepared to extend the scope of this provision. In fact, Article 8 was invoked
in a series of cases raised by transsexuals.86 The applicants had undergone
gender change treatment but were denied legal recognition of their new sexual
85. Judgment of 30 March 1993, ibidem, § 16.
86. European Court of Human Rights, Rees judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A No.
106; Cossey judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A No. 184; and B. v. France,
supra note 45.
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identity; it proved, inter alia, impossible to have their name adapted to their
new app'earance. When they brought a complaint before the Strasbourg Organs,
neither the Commission nor the Court doubted that Article 8 was applicable
to these cases. In B. v. France, the Court held that 'the refusal [of the French
authorities] to allow the applicant the change of forename requested by her was
a relevant factor from the point of view of Article 8' and that the inconven-
iences suffered by B. in her everyday life 'reached a sufficient degree of
seriousness to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 8'. On the basis
of the facts of the case the Court considered Article 8 to be violated.
In a recent series of cases, the European Commission of Human Rights was
directly confronted with the question of the extent to which the ECHR protects
the right to respect for a name. For a variety of reasons, individuals had been
trying to have their name changed. Having been unable to persuade their
national authorities to allow them to do so, they applied to the Commission
claiming a violation of Article 8. After some unsuccessful initial attempts,
two recent cases met with more success. In Burghartz and Schnyder Burghartz
v. Switzerland, the Commission explicitly held that 'the right for private life
as enshrined in Article 8 § l ECHR ensures a sphere within which everyone
can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of the personality. The right
to develop and fulfil one's personality necessarily comprises the right to
identity and, therefore, to a name'.89 The Commission observed that in many
countries stability in the use of surnames is considered important and agreed
that the right to change such names is restricted, but at the same time accepted
'that there could be exceptional cases where the carrying of a particular name
creates such suffering or practical difficulties that the right under Article 8 is
affected'.90
It should be noted that all these cases concern individuals who themselves
wanted a change of name. In contrast, in Konstantinidis it was the authorities
87. B. v. France, ibidem, pp. 52-54, §§ 58-63.
88. Appl. No. 8042/77, Hagmann-Husler v. Switzerland, Dec. 15-12-1977, D.R. 12, p. 202
and Appl. No. 16878/90, Boij v. Sweden, Dec. 29-6-1992, not yet reported in D.R.
89. European Commission of Human Rights, Appl. No. 16213/90, S. Burghartz and A.
Schnyder Burghartz v. Switzerland, Report adopted on 21-10-1992 (i.e before AG
Jacobs delivered his Opinion in the Konstantinidis case), § 47; the case is now pending
before the Court. The analysis was supported by 18 votes to l and was confirmed by
the Commission in Appl. No. 18131/91, Stjerna v. Finland, Report adopted on 8-7-
1993.
90. Sjtema v. Finland, ibidem, §§ 63-64. As to the merits of the case, a majority of the
Commission (12 votes to 9) found no violation of Article 8. The Commission empha-
sized that as a general rule a right to change one's surname is not protected by Article
8 ECHR; cf. Appl. No. 18806/91, B. v. the Netherlands, dec. of 1-9-1993.
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who decided to impose a new transcription on an existing name - a most
obvious interference with the individual's rights under Article 8. Moreover, in
testing whether this interference could be justified under the ECHR, the Con-
vention organs would not follow the predominantly economie approach of the
European Court of Justice. They would of course examine the extent to which
daily inconveniences occur, but they would not narrow the scope of the issue
by requiring the applicant to prove any specific injury in the exercise of his
profession. One can thus safely assume that Mr Konstantinidis would have had
a very strong case in Strasbourg.
Diverging interpretations? The remarks of the Advocate General with respect
to Article 8 ECHR were certainly not wrong but appear to be over-careful; the
latest developments of the Strasbourg case-law were not referred to. Nor did
the Court misinterpret Article 8 - it simply did not apply this provision at all.
It can be concluded that by emphasising the economie aspects of the case, the
ECJ did not afford as high a level of protection to Mr Konstantinidis' rights
as the Convention organs would do.
5. Concluding Remarks: Confusion and Conflict?
In Watson & Belmann, the UK government defended the position that the
should not review national measures for their compliance with human rights
Standards. It submitted the following observation:
Any exercise of overlapping jurisdiction by the institutions established by the Convention
and by the Court of Justice of the European Communities could give rise to confusion
and conflict, The generalized and somewhat imprecise language of the Convention and
of the exceptions to which most of the rights set out in Section I thereof are subject can
give rise to questions of construction which fall with the ultimate jurisdiction of the
institutions created by the Convenlion. Similarly, it is for those institutions alone to maKe
a ruling on a national measure which is contrary to the Convention but compatible wit»
Community law.91
The intervention of the UK government proved, in the long run, unsuccessful.
But this does not necessarily imply that the fear expressed by the UK was ill-
founded. On the contrary: 'confusion and conflict' may not as yet have
occurred, but this review of the ECJ's human rights case-law has confirrned
existing evidence that there are inconsistencies with the Strasbourg jurisprU"
dence - inconsistencies which can occur of course just as easily when the
91. See Walson & Belmann, supra note 22, p. 1191; emphasis added.
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reviews national measures as when Community acts are under review. Of
course it cannot be maintained that the ECJ has deliberately interpreted the
Convention in a diverging sense. The Hoechst/Niemietz comparison shows,
however, that divergencies can easily occur when the ECJ interprets the
Convention before the Strasbourg bodies have given their opinion.
The Konstantinidis case may be rather exotic, but it is important in three
Ways. First, it shows that it is difficult for Luxembourg to keep fully up-to-date
with the ever expanding Strasbourg case-law. Second, it illustrates the variety
of cases now submitted to the ECJ. The Court of Justice is expected to protect
human rights; the Court's repeated remark that 'it cannot accept measures
which are incompatible with fundamental rights'92 is apparently taken serious-
ly. But, and this is the third observation, the ECJ does not, or cannot, always
Hve up'to these high expectations. It has, as one might expect, a clear tendency
to approach cases from a common market point of view. The ECJ is only
Prepared to investigate human rights complaints if, and to the extent that, they
have a sufficiently strong link with (economie) activities falling 'within the
scope of Community law'. As a consequence, the ECJ refused to entertain
allegations of human rights violations in Cinéthèque, Demirel and Grogan, or
ignored them, as in Konstantinidis.
These cases have another common element: the human rights complaints
Were directed against national measures. This means that there was still a
remedy left. The complainants could exhaust local remedies and bring their case
before the European Commission of Human Rights. Any misinterpretation by
the domestic courts, possibly as a result of a preliminary ruling of the ECJ,
could then be corrected.
This solution does not exist, however, where an action is brought against
one of the Community institutions. In these circumstances, diverging interpre-
tations present a more serious problem. The cases referred to in § 4.1 illustrate
this. The impossibility of submitting, for example, the Hoechst case to Stras-
bourg resulted in a claim under the Convention being rejected on grounds
which a few years later appear to be wrong.
In 1992, the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities
demonstrated that it did not share the position expressed by the UK government
in Watson & Bellmann. While re-examining the protection of human rights in
the Community legal order and discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of Community accession to the ECHR, the Select Committee observed that
92. See e.g. Nold, supra note 8, p. 507 Wachauf, supra note 17, p. 2639 and ERT, supra
note 15, p. 2964.
